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A growing number of hyper-partisan alternative media outlets have sprung up online to
challenge mainstream journalism. However, research on news sharing in this particular media
environment is lacking. Based on the virality of sixteen partisan outlets’ coverage of immigration
and using the latest computational linguistic algorithm, the present study probes how hyperpartisan news sharing is related to source transparency, content styles, and moral framing. The
study finds that the most shared articles reveal author names, but not necessarily other types of
author information. The study uncovers a salient link between moral frames and virality. In
particular, audiences are more sensitive to moral frames that emphasize authority/respect,
fairness/reciprocity, and harm/care.
Keywords: news sharing, news diffusion, partisan media, Facebook, social media, moral framing,
moral foundations theory
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What drives hyper-partisan news sharing: Exploring the role of source, style, and content
The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election shook the nation, calling us to examine the divisive and
deceptive role played by media outlets and internet platforms (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). It is
known that public confidence in media institutions has been declining (Knight Foundation &
Gallup, 2018; Nielsen, Newman, Fletcher, & Kalogeropoulos, 2019). Mainstream media outlets
are increasingly challenged by the partisan alternative journalism represented by Breitbart News
and many other ultra-partisan outlets (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018). This form of alternative
journalism attacks mainstream journalism for its hegemonic and corrupted power in setting the
news agenda and narratives (Holt, Ustad Figenschou, & Frischlich, 2019). It emphasizes its
alternativeness by deviating from the mainstream media in styles and narratives, as well as by
catering to a largely insulated partisan audience (Benkler et al., 2018).
Hyper-partisan media are blamed as “the principal incubator and disseminator of
disinformation” (Faris et al., 2017, p. 19), citing concerns that partisan content tends to elicit
more social media engagements than mainstream media content (Silverman, 2016). While hyperpartisan, alternative journalism is known to benefit from social media platform architecture and
algorithms to maximize virality, our knowledge is still limited concerning factors related to
partisan news sharing in the social media environment (Tucker et al., 2018). Built on existing
literature on general news sharing behavior (see Valenzuela, Piña, & Ramírez, 2017 for review),
this study pays specific attention to partisan news sharing behavior. Guided by Aristole’s notion
of ethos, logos, and pathos, and drawing from the literature on media trust, dual information
processing, moral foundations, and news values to focus on three factors, namely, source
transparency, content styles, and moral framing. These factors were shown to significantly
predict news “shareworthiness” for mainstream media (dos Santos, Lycarião, & de Aquino,
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2019; Kim, 2015; Kümpel et al., 2015; Trilling, Tolochko, & Burscher, 2017). However, it is not
clear how they relate to news “shareworthiness” in a hyper-partisan media environment. In what
follows, we situate the factors in the hyper-partisan content, considering various ways partisan
audiences perceive media trust and selectively process information, as well as how hyperpartisan alternative journalism departs from traditional journalistic values and norms.
The rise of hyper-partisan alternative media outlets
Hyper-partisan alternative media outlets are on the rise (Holt et al., 2019), particularly on the
political right (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). The alternative outlets brand their “alternativeness”
through opposition to the alleged hegemonic, corrupted, and elitist mainstream media (Holt et
al., 2019). In doing so, the alternative outlets position themselves as “outsiders” of the system
who give voices to marginalized people and under-covered stories (Figenschou, & Ihlebæk,
2019) and invite citizen and anonymous reporting (Holt et al., 2019). The early form of
alternative journalism was grassroots-oriented and positioned mostly in the progressive left, but
has been recently appropriated by the alternative right to brand their own counter-hegemonic and
anti-elite media agenda (Holt et al., 2019). Exemplifying this new form of alternative journalism
is Breitbart News, which has become the spokesperson for the ethnonationalist movement called
the Alt-Right (Benkler et al., 2018; Marwick & Lewis, 2017). The boundary between
professional journalism and alternative journalism has also been blurred (Figenschou & Ihlebæk,
2019). It becomes debatable as to whether content propagated by the hyper-partisan outlets can
be regarded as news at all. This is because the alternative media ecosystem consists of not just
partisan blogs and news outlets but also fake news and clickbaity sites (Tandoc, Lim, & Ling,
2018). Holt et al. (2019) called for more research concerning the reach of hyper-partisan
alternative media, audience motivation and gratification. This study explores news sharing
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behavior as a way to gauge the influence of the alternative media and to understand the
preference, and motivation of their partisan audiences.
News sharing
News sharing facilitated by social media has redefined the reach and effect of news; unlike faceto-face interactions, where the reach and effect of news sharing are limited to a person’s
immediate social circles, news sharing on social media can impact a large and undefined
audience due to social media’s network effect and personalization algorithms (Trilling et al.,
2017). Several factors make social media-based news sharing conducive to the echo chamber
effect (Wang et al., 2017), causing the further spread of disinformation and partisan bias
(Benkler et al., 2018). First, the consumption of media content is increasingly driven not by
seeking the most informative content but by the validation of existing beliefs (Fisher, 2016).
Second, people are somewhat reluctant to share content that contradicts the prevailing values and
beliefs in their social circle (Liu, Rui, & Cui, 2017); they may be inclined to share news that
conforms to the expectation of a social group or share it only with like-minded people (Wang,
Hmielowski, Hutchens, & Beam, 2017). Such socially motivated news sharing decisions can be
facilitated by inferring from a wide range of bandwagon heuristics inductive of content
popularity within a social circle, such as the number of likes and shares; audiences use such
heuristics to judge the trustworthiness and relevancy of the content, resulting in a self-fulfilling
cycle (Tandoc et al., 2018).
An extensive body of literature deals with what factors predict news sharing (dos Santos,
Lycarião, & de Aquino, 2019; Kim, 2015; Kümpel et al., 2015; Trilling et al., 2017). Some
research has investigated audience factors through the theoretical lens of uses and gratifications
and user characteristics (Kalogeropoulos et al., 2017; Lee & Ma, 2012). Such studies typically
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use the survey/experimental design for reaching causal conclusions. Nevertheless, the ecological
validity of the studies is constrained (Trilling et al., 2017). To overcome the shortcoming,
another body of studies relies on observed behavioral data to examine content-level factors
(García-Perdomo et al., 2018; Trilling et al., 2017). It draws on a number of theoretical
frameworks to discover factors of content “shareworthiness,” including news values, which
posits what types of stories are favored by journalists and news audience alike (Eilders, 2006;
Trilling et al., 2017); news framing, which deals with how selective presentations of issues and
events invoke different audience responses (Valenzuela et al., 2017); information processing,
arguing that certain heuristic cues are intrinsically more attention-grabbing (Chaiken, Liberman,
& Eagly, 1989), which consequently relates to more sharing; and lastly, audience expectations of
journalistic transparency and interactivity amidst waves of digitalization of news production
(Fletcher & Park, 2017; Jahng & Littau, 2016).
Through synthesizing the theoretical lens used in previous works, we narrowed the focus
to three content and source-level factors to be discussed in-depth (i.e., source transparency,
content styles, and moral frames). The three factors map onto the notion of Aristole’s ethos,
logos, and pathos. To the best of our knowledge, the current study is one of the earliest attempts
to investigate these factors as predictors of hyper-partisan news sharing. This study does not
assume hyper-partisan news sharing to be fundamentally different from conventional news
sharing. It does, however, recognize the uniqueness of hyper-partisan outlets in their
predominantly sensational story-telling, the moralization of public issues, and in their partisan
audience base who may have a different perception of media trust than the general news
audience.
Ethos: Source transparency for media trust
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Ethos relates to convincing the audience through the source’s credibility and character.
To that end, media trust is essential to audience engagement with news content (Fletcher & Park,
2017; Jahng & Littau, 2016). Trust in traditional journalism rests upon objective, balanced, and
expert-based reporting (Lee, 2015). However, trust in the hyper-partisan alternative media outlets
is likely ideologically entangled. Put differently, media trust and perceived journalistic quality
hinge in part upon whether content creators’ ideological stance aligns with that of the audience
(Metzger et al., 2015; Meyer et al., 2010). Conservatives along with populists in the US have
labeled mainstream media “fake news” and decry “liberal bias” (Lischka, 2019), whereas the
same “fake news” phenomenon is extensively tied to the manipulated and misleading pro-Trump
coverage during the 2016 election (Bakir & McStay, 2018). Also challenging the notion of media
trust is the digitalization of the newsroom as content creators join social media. Content creators
need to adapt to a digital environment that values social presence, interactivity, and transparency
(Jahng & Littau, 2016; Lee, 2015). As shown in Jahng and Littau’s (2016) study, journalists who
are active on social media are perceived as more credible. In a nutshell, media trust in the digital
age and partisan era is based upon ideological alliance and interactivity, to which transparency is
the key.
Transparency is about making the editorial production process open to the public so that
the audience can directly interact with media outlets to provide feedback and to learn about
media outlets’ ideological stances. Transparency is specifically manifested in revealing
information about authors and using external sources to support media outlets’ presentation and
interpretation of current affairs (Chadha & Koliska, 2015). An experiment by Curry and Stroud
(2017) found that a news article is perceived as more credible when it reveals the author’s name,
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picture, and affiliation. Revealing such author information shows a willingness to invite public
scrutiny of a media outlet.
Media content also typically presents the authors’ social media presence, which is a sign
of interactivity (Jahng & Littau, 2016). Additionally, author information provides social cues
that can reduce the social distance between content creators and the audience. According to the
social presence theory, people become attentive to the scarce social cues to form impressions
when they communicate in a virtual environment where verbal cues are lacking (Walther, 1993).
Transparency is relevant to hyper-partisan alternative media outlets for two competing
reasons. Disclosing author information allows the audiences to study and vet the authors’
ideological stances. The information even helps like-minded audiences develop a para-social
relationship with partisan content creators—such relationship is linked to stronger perceived
source credibility (Landreville & Niles, 2019). Partisan media figures (such as Rush Limbaugh,
Andrew Breitbart, and Alex Jones) and their personal brands play a pivotal role in defining
contemporary partisan politics (Jutel, 2018). Hyper-partisan outlets may even use the disclosure
to create a façade of accountability to legitimize their dubious content. Meanwhile, some hyperpartisan outlets may emphasize on anonymous contributions to be distinguished from traditional
journalism (Holt., 2019). In short, while traditional journalism calls for transparency, the
incentives for hyper-partisan outlets to adopt the transparency principle vary. We approach the
role of transparency through an exploratory research question.
RQ1: What is the relationship between the amount of author details disclosed in news
articles and news sharing?
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Another way to build up public trust is by citing source materials and evidence through
hyperlinks (Coddington, 2014; Chadha & Koliska, 2015). The hyperlinking practice serves as “a
journalistic parallel to the academic reference system” (Mor & Reich, 2018, p. 1092). Early
studies found that alternative outlets (e.g., political bloggers and citizen journalists) had
extensively used hyperlinking to cite raw materials and data, whereas their mainstream
counterparts preferred internal links to formal publications (Mor & Reich, 2018). By citing
sources through hyperlinks, media outlets provide readily available background information to
audiences, allowing the audiences to verify claims and the authenticity of content themselves.
We expect that source-citing to be an audience-friendly practice that provides richer information
and communicates a commitment to quality reporting. Hence, H1 is proposed.
H1: The amount of external sources cited via hyperlinks in news articles positively
predicts news sharing.
Logos and pathos: Content styles for attention
Traditional journalism is thought of as objective and ‘just the facts.’ The rational style and its deemphasis on emotion have long been a marker of distinction between professional journalism
and tabloid journalism (Peters, 2011). Emotion is often, albeit unfairly, dismissed, and conflated
with sensational coverage (Peters, 2011; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019). The norm of rationality in news
production, that is presenting logical, critical, and evidence-based narratives are rooted in
Aristotle’s logos (appealing to reason). An audience hence forms impressions partly based on the
structure and style of online content (Choi & Stvilia, 2015; Rowley & Johnson, 2013).
In relations to Aristotle’s pathos (appealing to emotions), recently, a growing number of
studies have paid increased attention to emotion’s “role in the production, texts and audience
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engagement with journalism” (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019, p. 5, emphasis in original; Zou, 2018).
Compared to traditional journalism that values rationality and objectivity, the contemporary
hyper-partisan alternative journalism is sensational, featuring dramatic events and appealing to
audiences’ emotional responses with intensified or dramatic language (Mourão & Robertson,
2019). Online space is filled with emotions as collective grievance attracts like-minded people
and affective storytelling drives affective publics to take actions (Papacharissi, 2015). The use of
emotion in reporting corresponds to Aristotle’s pathos (appealing to the emotions) and is
supported by ample evidence concerning the persuasiveness of emotional appeals (Bail, Brown,
& Mann, 2017; Kilgo, Lough, & Riedl, 2017; Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012; Veltri & Atanasova,
2015).
It is also a salient factor of news sharing (Berger, 2011; Khuntia, Sun, & Yim, 2016;
Kim, 2015). Several theories explain why the use of emotion is prevalent and effective in
information diffusion. First, emotion is one of the core news values (Trilling et al., 2017). Recall
that news values are a set of characteristics that make certain news stories more appealing to
journalists and audiences (García-Perdomo et al., 2018; Trilling et al., 2017). Second, sharing
emotional news is a natural process of creating social bonding and adapting to traumatic events
(Harber & Cohen, 2005). Noteworthy is that emotional contagion online even occurs without the
audience’s awareness: Kramer and colleagues (2014) observed that when Facebook users were
exposed to negative content in the Facebook timeline, they subsequently expressed more
negative thoughts in posts. Third, in terms of information processing, people are wired to be
more attentive to emotional cues, making emotional language and content an effective tool in
eliciting attention and attitude change (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989).
H2a: The strength of emotion presented in news articles positively predicts news sharing.
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RQ2: What is the relationship between the expressed rationality in news articles and
news sharing?
On top of the rational versus emotional style difference that differentiates traditional and
alternative journalism, another style factor studied in the literature is the use of audiovisual
content (Tucker et al., 2018). Newsrooms use multimedia journalism to arouse the audience’s
engagement (Pincus, Wojcieszak, & Boomgarden, 2017). Multimedia content provides “realism
cues” to create a more direct sensory experience (Sundar, 2008) and is effective in stimulating
audiences (Tucker et al., 2018). A wealth of evidence suggests a positive link between including
multimedia content and a higher chance of information sharing (Chung, 2017; Liu et al., 2017),
including the sharing of partisan content (Tucker et al., 2018).
H2b: The use of multimedia content in news articles positively predicts news sharing.
Pathos: Moral framing
Framing is one of the most discussed journalistic practices (Entman, 1993; Ryan, Carragee, &
Meinhofer, 2001). Recently, a growing number of studies have explored framing as a
determining factor in news sharing (Valenzuela et al., 2017). To frame a story is to selectively
present and emphasize certain aspects of events by using specific keywords, phrases, sources,
and examples (de Vreese, 2012). Framing produces certain interpretations of events that are
deemed desirable by the news audience and the newsroom. Hence, framing is frequently used by
ideologically leaning news outlets to promote certain partisan narratives (Lowry, 2008).
Commonly used frames are economic consequences, conflicts, human interest, and morality
(Valenzuela et al., 2017).

12

The current study focuses on a particular type of framing called moral framing. Moral
framing refers to the practice of putting “the event or issue in the context of values, moral
prescriptions, normative messages, and religious or cultural tenets” (Semetko & Valkenburg,
2000; Valenzuela et al., 2017, p. 809). The focus on moral frames is based on two reasons. First,
past research shows that moral framing is a particularly salient predictor of news sharing.
Specifically, in a comprehensive examination of how different news frames (e.g., economic
consequence, conflicts, morality, etc.) drive sharing, Valenzuela and team (2017) found that
moral frames are associated with increased news sharing, whereas the other frames decrease
sharing. Although moral frames are not as frequently used as other frames, they are the primary
perspective through which the audience understands current events (Valenzuela et al., 2017).
Valenzuela and colleagues (2017) argued that moral framing drives sharing because moral
frames tend to invoke strong emotions. Moreover, moral frames convey social values that the
audience likely identifies with – an important factor to consider in the partisan age and amidst
cultural wars (Brady et al., 2017). The second reason is that moral frames correspond to different
moral foundations, which can be seen as the root causes of policy disagreements and partisan
divides (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). It needs to be recognized that moralizing public issues
to engage audiences is not unique to hyper-partisan journalism: in the book New Class War, Lind
(2019) criticized the mainstream media’s moral framing of populist and culturally conservative
voters as brainwashed and intolerant. However, considering the political agenda of hyperpartisan journalism, we assume that moral framing is particularly salient in hyper-partisan
media’s approach to content.
While the existing literature on news sharing shows a positive link between moral frames
and news sharing, no current study explores how specific moral frames are associated with
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sharing. Moral frames can be constructed through different moral foundations (Haidt & Graham,
2007). The moral foundations theory posits that people of different ideological camps rely on
different moral intuitions to justify actions and attitudes (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). The
differences in moral foundations can account for the root causes of partisan divides in the socalled culture war in America (Graham et al., 2009). Five moral dimensions are proposed by the
theory: Harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity.
Harm/care and fairness/reciprocity are linked to the ethics of care and justice (Graham et
al., 2009). The two moral foundations involve protecting, caring, and nurturing the vulnerable,
with an emphasis on the value of individual human beings—a social value widely embraced by
individualistic western cultures. Nevertheless, many non-western cultures embrace moral
foundations that value groups over individuals, hence forming the other three moral foundations:
ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity (Graham et al., 2009). The three
foundations stress duty, commitment, and self-control, rather than individual autonomy (Graham
et al., 2009). Studies show that the first two dimensions, namely harm/care, fairness/reciprocity,
are the dominant moral foundations embraced by liberals, whereas the conservatives endorse and
use the five foundations more equally (Graham et al., 2009).
As hyper-partisan outlets often cover socially and morally divisive issues (e.g., abortion,
immigration, healthcare, etc.) and such issues become the major vehicles for conveying partisan
agendas, we expect a salience of moral framing in partisan news sharing:
H3: News sharing is related to the presence of moral frames.
RQ3: What is the relationship between news sharing and different moral frames based on
moral foundations?
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Methods
Sample choice and data cleaning
Facebook was chosen as the site of investigation, given that it is one of the most widely used
social sharing platforms in the U.S. (Perrin & Anderson, 2019). To identify hyper-partisan
outlets on Facebook, we first used Benkler et al. (2017) and Tucker and colleagues’ (2018) work
to create a preliminary list of 52 hyper-partisan sites. Based on the Alexa web traffic data, we
then selected the ten most popular and ten least popular sites from the list to ensure the
representativeness of media outlets of varying degrees of influence. We identified the outlets’
Facebook pages (one outlet was dropped from the list due to its absence on Facebook). Table 1
shows a list of outlets selected and their Facebook activities. The top outlets are predominantly
conservative, while the liberal outlets tend to be among the least popular in terms of web traffic.
Between 11/08/2015 and 11/08/2016, the top outlets produced a total of 83,181 Facebook posts,
and the bottom-ranked outlets produced 44,398 posts.
The final list had 17 outlets, including the conservative Breitbart, InfoWars, The Daily
Caller, Conservative Tribune, and the liberal outlets Addicting Info and Truthout. To control for
different news outlets’ topical preference, the study used the single case design, focusing on the
coverage of immigration. The issue of immigration galvanized robust media attention during the
2016 U.S. presidential election, fueled by then-candidate Donald Trump’s calls for building the
border wall and a travel ban targeted on certain Muslim nations, as well as his strong stance on
illegal immigration and the deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA). We used a
customized Python script to collect the selected news outlets’ public Facebook posts. At the time
of the study, Facebook had a public API to allow researchers to download any public page’s
posts. However, the public API has become restricted after the Cambridge Analytica scandal.
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We identified immigration-related articles based on a set of search criteria: the articles
must be the original content produced by the selected outlets and shared by the outlets as link
posts (a type of Facebook posts in which users insert a URL and add commentary); Facebook
post content, and page descriptions should contain at least one of the following keywords:
immigration, immigrants, immigrant, travel ban, DACA, dreamer, and illegal alien. Table 1
breaks down the outlets by the total number of their Facebook posts and the number of posts
about immigration. In total, there were 1,805 link posts before the data cleaning.
We then used Newspaper3k, a Python package for article scraping, to extract article
content from links in the Facebook posts. Aidded by a manual valiation, the process identified
128 posts with expired URLs which indicate deleted content; . In the remainder of 1,677 posts
with unexpired website content, we further removed 302 posts linking to webpage content
containing predominantly videos/photos rather than text. We recognized that removing the
predominantly multi-media content may limit the generalizability of our findings. However, it is
a necessary compromise due to the use of text-based measures for linguistic characteristics. In
the cases where duplicated content is found, the likes and shares of articles were averaged to
control for media outlets’ cross-posting. The final sample included 1,156 unique immigrationrelated articles.
----------------------------------------------- INSERT TABLE 1 -------------------------------------------Measures
To measure the independent variables in the study, we used both manual coding and
computational techniques. To ensure the accuracy of the manual coding, the coding task was
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equally divided among three coders. The third coder checked the entire coding results to correct
any discrepancies.
Source transparency. Recall that source transparency is operationalized as (1) revealing
author’s details and (2) citing through external hyperlinks. We manually inspected each article,
checking whether an article revealed the author’s name, photo, bio, and email address/social
media handles. We coded the presence of the above information on the article page or on a
separate webpage linked to the article. The numbers: 84% of the articles disclosed the author’s
name (articles without author name typically use the outline name as the byline); 47% of the
articles contained author photos; 51% had information about an author’s contact and social
media handles, and 54% showed the author’s bio. We then counted unique external sources cited
via hyperlinks per article. With the focus on external sources, any internal hyperlink
(hyperlinking to content produced by the same outlet) was excluded. To count the hyperlink
sources, we used a Python package to extract all hyperlinks present on an article page and
aggregated the external links based on the same domain name (i.e., separate links to different
New York Times articles will be counted as one because they all come from the same web
source). We then removed links to social media and common web platforms (e.g., Twitter,
Instagram, Reddit, Facebook, YouTube, Tumblr, Apple, Amazon, and Google); we also removed
links to news aggregation sites (e.g., feedburner) and links embedded for audience tracking (e.g.,
quantacas and breezy). On average, an article contained more than three hyperlinked sources.
Content styles were unpacked into three variables: (1) the strength of emotion, (2) the
strength of expressed rationality, and (3) the amount of multimedia content. The first two
variables for content styles were measured using the dictionary-based linguistic analytic program
LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015).
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LIWC scans texts and calculates the prominence of about 90 types of words and symbols
(Pennebaker et al., 2015). First, the strength of emotion was measured by the affect score in
LIWC. The Affect score calculates the proportion of emotion words in text with a higher score
indicating a stronger emotion (mean = 4.10, sd= 1.72). Second, the strength of expressed
rationality was gauged by Analytic score in LIWC (on a 0-100 scale). The use of Analytic words
(mean = 84.84, sd=15.06) indicates a logic and sophisticated thinking, as opposed to intuitive
and narrative thinking (Pennebaker et al., 2015). Lastly, the amount of multimedia content was
measured by counting story-related pictures/videos on the article page (mean =1.39, sd = 1.45)
(not including advertising content and multimedia elements in the recommended/related article
section).
Moral frames were measured by applying the moral foundations dictionary (MFD
hereafter) (Graham et al., 2009). The dictionary includes 295 words for each of the five
foundations, namely, harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, group/loyalty, authority/respect, and
purity/sanctity (Graham et al., 2009). The words for each moral foundation cover a bi-polar
continuum between foundation-supporting (referred to as virtues) and foundation-violating
(referred to as vices). Following previous studies using MDF (Garten et al., 2016; Hoover et al.,
2018), we used the Distributed Dictionary Representations (DDR) approach to apply MFD
(Garten et al., 2018). DDR is different from the dictionary-based word count approach (such as
the one used in LIWC). Rather than counting the appearance of dictionary words, DDR accounts
for semantic relations of the terms in the dictionary (Garten et al., 2018) Hence, DDR is
advantageous (see Garten et al., 2018): it allows researchers to count not just the appearance of
dictionary words but words contextually and semantically similar to the dictionary words, which
can address dynamic and generative aspects of language use. To implement DDR, we used the
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open-source Python code provided by Garten and colleagues (2018). The codes first generate a
Word2Vec model using the pre-trained Google News Corpus containing (3 billion running
words) word vector model (3 million 300-dimension English word vectors)and then compute the
similarity score between dictionary words and the studied text.
The dependent variables were the number of shares and likes of a Facebook post linking
to a selected article. The two variables reflected two levels of news sharing. Liking an article
does not have the same level of significance as sharing does. But liking an article may drive
future sharing because it makes the article more visible to a user’s friends. The shares and like
count were obtained from the Facebook API, capturing the scope of news diffusion at the
moment of data collection. If the same article was shared multiple times, their likes and shares
were averaged. On average, an article in the study dataset was shared 862 times (sd = 1,785) and
liked 1,526 times (sd = 3,165).
The model had the following control variables: (1) the selected news outlets’ Facebook
page follower counts. On average, a selected outlet had a follower count of 2.58 million (sd =
1.83 million); (2) word count of an article (mean = 532; sd= 489); (3) the length of time since
posting, under the assumption that earlier posts tended to receive more shares than the more
recent ones. The length of time since posting was calculated as the day difference between the
last day of data collection (04/19/2016 for Breitbart and 06/12/2017 for the rest) and the day an
article was posted. On average, an article had been on Facebook for a year at the time of data
collection. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables in the model.
------------------------------------------------ INSERT TABLE 2 -------------------------------------------
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Results
We started by fitting the dependent variables to different distributions (e.g., normal, Poisson,
negative binomial, and log-normal). Similar to dos Santos, Lycarião and de Aquino’s (2019), we
found that the dependent variables were close to a log-normal distribution: The skewness of
share count was 5.77, while its logarithm’s skewness was -0.33. The skewness of like count was
6.67, while its logarithm’s skewness was -0.31. Based on this, our analyses use the logarithm of
each of the dependent variables.
The unit of analysis is each article content. Because styles and formats of the articles are
likely dependent on each news outlet’s practices, hence the measures of the article-level source
transparency, content styles, moral frames are not independent of each other. To address this
issue, we applied multilevel regression analyses using the lme4 package in R. The Facebook
page IDs of the selected news outlets were used as the random effect variable. Each model was
checked for multicollinearity (using VIF scores), homogeneity, and independence, as well as
normality of residuals. We found a strong positive correlation between the five virtue-related and
five vices-related moral frames variables. That means if an article emphasizes the violation of a
moral foundation, it also likely stresses the support of such a moral foundation. Consequently,
the initial model including all of the moral frames had VIF scores between 8 and 14 for most of
the moral frame variables. To prevent the multicollinearity issues, the final model includes only
moral virtue variables, in which the VIF scores range between 1 and 4, indicating that the
multicollinearity issue is largely tolerable. Table 3 shows the two multilevel regression models
with shares count and likes count as the dependent variables respectively. For an easier
comparison in explanatory power, the variables were rescaled to have a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1.
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We summarize findings by the order of hypotheses and research questions. Concerning
source transparency (RQ1), revealing author name consistently predicted more sharing and liking
across the four models; However, articles showing author bio were significantly less shared and
liked. H1 posited that the number of external sources cited via hyperlinks positively predict news
sharing. This hypothesis was not supported. Articles with more external hyperlinked sources
tended to receive fewer likes.
Concerning content styles, H2a predicted a positive relationship between the strength of
emotion in articles and news sharing. The support of the hypothesis was mixed. More emotional
content was only significantly liked more but it had no significant impact on actual sharing
behavior. Regarding the relationship between the expressed rationality and news sharing (RQ2),
we found no significant relationship between a formal and logical writing style and like and
share counts. H2b, which predicted a positive association between the use of multimedia content
and news sharing, was not supported due to the non-significant role of the number of videos and
images in articles.
Lastly, H3 was supported as multiple moral frames were significantly associated with
news sharing. Specifically, articles that presented a moral frame emphasizing the support of
authority/respect were significantly shared and liked more, whereas articles emphasizing the
support of the fairness/reciprocity value were significantly less shared. Additionally, articles
mentioning the support of the care moral value received significantly more share, yet fewer likes.
------------------------------------------------ INSERT TABLE 3 ------------------------------------------Discussion
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We conducted this study to fill two gaps in the current literature on news sharing behavior. The
first gap is a lack of systematic examination of content and source characteristics associated with
news sharing in the hyper-partisan media environment; the second gap is a lack of attention paid
to content framing through moral lenses. The study uses a mixed-methods design relying on both
manual content analysis and computational linguistic analytics, which includes the last
Distributed Dictionary Representation algorithms. Although the study is limited by its crosssectional design, findings do reveal a potentially powerful role of moral framing as well as
source transparency. We believe our preliminary and correlational findings can pave the ground
for future causal testing.
Our argument concerning source transparency is based on the premise that media outlets
need to be held accountable by being transparent about who writes what. Source transparency is
a journalistic norm upheld in traditional rooms (Chadha & Koliska, 2015) and is associated with
media trust and positive audience engagement (Curry & Stroud, 2017). We also maintain that the
partisan audience may expect different types of source transparency due to their partisan leaning
and selective information processing. Study findings show that being transparent remains an
important factor, but perhaps what matters more is what kind of information is revealed to the
public: At the minimum, it appears that outlets need to reveal authors’ names. Holt and colleague
(2019, p. 4) observed that alternative media have been more welcoming to “a democratic bottomup inclusion of non-professionals,” allowing non-professionals to anonymously publish their
own content. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the studied outlets reveal authors’ names and the
partisan audience does not seem to prefer anonymous submissions. It could be that anonymously
produced content is generally of lower quality, thus lacking appeal to the audience. It is also
plausible that audiences use the disclosure of author name as a heuristic cue for media trust or
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content legitimacy (Sundar, 2008). Amid the concern over how anonymity affords the spread of
disinformation and partisan propaganda (Marwick & Lewis, 2017), this finding could be read as
a reassuring sign that the most viral content, regardless of its partisan biases, has human faces
behind it. What was unexpected though was that revealing too much author information was
linked to less sharing—this is contrary to what social presence theory predicts and what the norm
of interactivity demands (Jahng & Littau, 2016, Lee, 2015). It is worth noting that in Jahng and
Littau’s (2016) study, which explored journalists’ online social presence, the study participants
were specifically asked to rate the credibility of journalists. In the current study, it is not clear
whether the audience considers the authors’ credibility before they share the news. We suspect
that the audience pays limited attention to who writes the article, as they are constrained by their
fragmented attention. The audience might be more likely drawn to other attention-grabbing
elements such as sensational content and clickbaity titles. Another possibility is that partisan
audiences, who look for opinion congruence (Metzger et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 2010), use
media outlets as the heuristic for ideological leaning. Since the studied partisan outlets already
have clearly defined editorial slants, the audience may not necessarily use the author cues for
inferring about a particular piece of content’s editorial posture. Alternatively, there is the
possibility that the audience is already familiar with the authors, thus just knowing their names
provides enough information to form a judgment. In synthesis, the finding suggests that the norm
of transparency, which is widely adopted by the mainstream journalism, has relevance for hyperpartisan alternative journalism but the extent to which it may affect content popularity is a
function of not how much information but what kind of information is shared with the audience.
Our argument regarding content styles is first grounded in the debate on rational appeals
versus emotional appeals. We find a quite limited role of content styles in news sharing—content

23

styles only matter so much as to the liking of the content (as opposed to the actual sharing). This
is somewhat surprising given prior studies that reveal a salient role of emotion and multimedia
content in virality (Kilgo, Lough, & Riedl, 2017). Hyper-partisan journalism is known for its
sensational coverage (Mourão & Robertson, 2019), the finding casts doubt over the impact of
such sensational approach to news. It may invoke positive audience engagement (in the form of
liking) but may not result in a wider dissemination of the content. A plausible explanation is that
media sensationalize news events not just through using emotional words but through the use of
moral frames (the factor to be discussed next). Moral frames generally invoke strong emotions
(Valenzuela et al., 2017). The negative link between using multimedia and liking warrant further
investigation. One reason for that is having too many multimedia cues causes cognitive overload
and affects user experience.
The most significant aspect of our findings is about the salient role of moral framing in
driving virality. This link is well-supported by previous studies that identify a link between
framing and news sharing (Valenzuela et al., 2017) and the latest moral foundations theory on
how partisan divides can be traced back to different moral intuitions on which people form
opinions (Graham et al., 2009). What is particularly interesting is our discovery of the divergent
effects of different moral frames. First, the audience appears to be more sensitive to content
using the authority/respect frame. Note that this moral frame is indicated by words related to law,
obey, honor, respect, and such. A post-hoc analysis reveals that the articles most representative
of this moral frame are those discussing the constitutionality of immigration policies and
proposals under President Obama, the enforcement of border protection. In short, this moral
frame is centered around the law and enforcement aspect of the immigration issue. The finding
seems to confirm the existing research that ties support for Trump supporters’ conservative

24

values over social groups, order, and authority (Choma & Hanoch, 2017). Second, the use of the
moral frame of fairness could deter sharing. This moral frame is represented by using keywords
similar to rights, justice, fairness, and equity. The topics in the top articles representing this
moral frame are mixed, ranging from criticism of Trump’s violation of minorities’ rights to an
endorsement of Trump’s proposed ideological tests for immigrants, and to alleged illegal voting
by immigrants. Previous studies found that the fairness frame is more endorsed by the liberal
than with the conservative (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). The dominance of conservative
outlets in the study sample might contribute to the unpopularity of this frame. Third, the moral
frame of care may produce contradictory behavioral effects: the audience dislikes the frame but
tends to share it more. This frame set emphasizes the protection of individuals from harm and
other forms of injustice (Graham et al., 2009). The studied content associated with this value
tends to include words semantically and contextually similar to safe, peace, empathy,
compassion, and others. The articles most representative of this moral frame are those discussing
the protection of LGBTQ migrants and aging migrants (by liberal outlets), and Pope Francis’s
call to help poor immigrants (a position lauded by liberal outlets but viewed skeptically by
conservative outlets). It is possible that the frame is associated with highly controversial issues
that lead to negative sentiments toward the content. But the controversial content might be
preferred in terms of sharing in order to provoke and to invoke moral outrage among the
audience’s like-minded peers.
The implication of our findings concerning moral frames is two-folded. First, it suggests
that in deciding whether or not to share news articles, audiences likely pay attention to both the
source and characteristics of actual content. The patterns concerning the appeals of specific
moral frames seem to imply that audiences do look for ideological congruence (Metzger et al.,
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2010; Meyer et al., 2010). This finding leads us to argue that in order to understand
disinformation and partisanship on social media, we need to go beyond examining problematic
platforms and practices. The current literature is constrained by its focus on state-sponsored
information campaigns and fringe groups’ systematic manipulation of customization algorithms
for public attention (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). While those are important factors to consider and
such malpractices should be held accountable, overlooking what really causes political divides
misses an opportunity to truly bridge schisms in society. Instead of simply de-legitimizing
certain viewpoints and practices, this study follows Haidt’s (2012) calls for a deeper
understanding of partisan divides through the lens of moral foundations and examine how such
divides are manifested on the micro-level in term of news framing. Currently, our findings are
promising, adding further evidence to previous studies that link framing to news sharing and also
confirming the salience of moral foundations in the current scholarly debates on disinformation
and partisanship. Second, given the shareworthiness of certain moral frames, it is worth asking
the following question: what role does social media algorithms play in amplifying specific moral
frames? Scholars have long suspected recommendation algorithms as the culprit in reinforcing
political biases and divides (Marwick & Lewis, 2017), despite more recent evidence claiming
that the echo chamber effects and filter bubbles that may result from algorithms might be
overrated (Bruns, 2019; Weeks, Ksiazek, & Holbert, 2016). It remains unclear to what extent
moral frames are amplified or limited by algorithms digital platforms employ.
In view of the findings concerning how news content is related to audience engagement,
we are aware of the fact that many audiences, when consuming news online, may not read
beyond headlines and the first paragraph (Gabielkov et al., 2016). In the post-hoc analysis, we
applied the same model to news titles and short descriptions of the news articles shared in
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Facebook posts. We identified several rather similar patterns: Titles and short descriptions that
emphasize the support of authority/respect were significantly shared and liked more, whereas
those focusing on the fairness/reciprocity frame were shared less. Likewise, content emphasizing
the moral frame of care also received fewer likes. These findings suggest a high degree of
consistency in moral frames used in the actual news content and in the Facebook posts that
promote the news content. It may also suggest that the same audience engagement dynamics
exist even for those skimming through the content.
Limitations and future directions
Readers are reminded of the following limitations of the study. First, the study does not provide a
causal explanation, although we can speculate on multiple explanations of the findings based on
the reviewed theoretical angles (i.e., news values, information processing, and media trust).
Second, the study focuses solely on the coverage of immigration. While such a topical focus can
effectively control for variations in topical selection that exist among outlets, it may skew some
findings towards a particular political group because of the group’s ability to sensationalize the
issue through attention-grabbing headlines and content (e.g., linking immigration to crime vs.
linking immigration to humanitarian crises). Third, outlets of different ideological camps may
focus on different events related to immigration (e.g., crime, social welfare, the debate over
multiculturalism, national security, etc.), which could result in different framing. Fourth, the
creation of the list of hyper-partisan outlets itself is debatable. Conservatives and liberals have all
accused the other side of spreading fake news. The list may include outlets that strive to do real
journalism as well as “clickbait” sites whose mission is maximizing audience attention without
attending to basic journalistic standards. Lumping them together may overlook important
variations within the hyper-partisan media ecosystem. Fifth, the study assumes that when users
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share a news article, the users explicitly endorse the content. Nevertheless, it is possible that
news sharing is for expressing disagreement. Due to the lack of data, our interpretations of
audience motivations are limited. Sixth, the expired URLs may link to erroneous or controversial
news content, which media outlets later deleted. This represents a lost opportunity to study the
truly problematic side of hyper-partisan journalism. To expand the current research line, future
studies can use a quasi-experiment on Facebook to test the effect of the four factors on news
sharing. Future studies should also include a broader selection of issues and news events.
Moreover, future studies need to consider adding additional news value variables to the model to
account for the social construction of controversy, deviance, and stigma.
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